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I. INTRODUCTION
T. Wright Dickinson is a rancher in Western Colorado who believes “a moral
duty obligates him to protect his herd.”2 As a cattle rancher, one of his primary
concerns is the state’s reintroduction of wolves.3 In November 2020, voters in
Colorado enacted Proposition 114, which directs the Colorado Parks and Wildlife
Commission to reintroduce grey wolves into Western Colorado.4 Ranchers fear the
wolves will injure or kill their livestock.5 Some ranchers view this measure as an
“imposition by wolf-friendly urban liberals” to attack agriculture and evict
ranchers from public lands.6 This is just one of many examples of the urban–rural
divide.7
This urban–rural divide is not unique to Colorado ranchers.8 On June 25, 2020,
the California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) enacted the Advanced Clean
Trucks Rule (“ACT”).9 Beginning in 2024, the ACT will mandate a percentage of
trucks sold in California must be zero emission vehicles (“ZEVs”).10
Implementing the ACT in California’s rural areas would be very costly for two
reasons: (1) the lack of charging stations in the rural areas and (2) rural truck
operators tend to purchase used vehicles that cost less than ZEVs.11 Furthermore,
the ACT also overlooks the likelihood of increased public safety power shutoffs

2. Bruce Finley, In Western Colorado, Wary Ranchers Eye Wolves’ Arrival and Fear Urban Voters Will
Introduce More, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA (July 26, 2020), https://www.dailycamera.com/2020/07/26/coloradowolf-reintroduction-ranchers-ballot-measure (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
3. Id.; see Aislinn Maestas, An Introduction to Species Reintroduction, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N (Feb. 9,
2011), https://blog.nwf.org/2011/02/an-introduction-to-species-reintroduction/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (describing animal reintroduction as the process in which animals that are held and bred in
captivity are released into the wild, in areas they once inhabited).
4. Colorado Voters Adopt Proposition 114, Pave Way for Wolf Reintroduction, DEFENDERS WILDLIFE
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://defenders.org/newsroom/colorado-voters-adopt-proposition-114-pave-way-wolfreintroduction (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
5. See Wolf Depredation Cases Escalate to Record Levels in Idaho, IDAHO RANGELAND RES. COMM’N
(July 24, 2018), https://idrange.org/press-release/wolf-depredation-cases-escalate-to-record-levels-in-idaho/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[F]ederal authorities responded to a record 113 different
sheep and cattle ranches in the 2018 state fiscal year to perform necropsies on wolf-livestock kills”).
6. Finley, supra note 2.
7. See id. (describing how “wolf-friendly urban liberal” are imposing wolves onto the rural ranchers); see
also Letter from Staci Heaton, Senior Regul. Aff. Advoc., Rural Cnty. Representatives of Cal. to Richard Corey,
Exec.
Officer,
Cal.
Air
Res.
Bd.,
2
(May
21,
2020),
https://legistarwebproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/attachment/pdf/607769/Proposed_ACT_Regulations_Ltr_to_CARB_05
212020__1_.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how proposed regulation that
may work in the urban cities is infeasibility in the rural counties of California).
8. See Heaton, supra note 7 (describing the infeasibility of implementing proposed regulations in the rural
counties of California).
9. Advanced Clean Trucks, CAL. AIR RES. BD., https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/advancedclean-trucks (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. Advanced Clean Trucks Regulation, 43 Cal. Regulatory Notice Reg. 1458 (approved June 26, 2020)
(to be codified at CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13. § 1963.1).
11. Heaton, supra note 7, at 1.
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(“PSPS”) due to increased chances of wildfires in rural areas.12 A multi-day PSPS
would disable all local government services and will immobilize all electric
transportation.13 Even if there were electric vehicle charging stations in rural areas,
the lack of electricity would make the charging stations useless.14
Additionally, an Executive Order from California Governor Gavin Newsom
mandates that by 2045, all medium- and heavy-duty trucks operated in California
must be ZEVs.15 However, the Executive Order mentions that any order mandating
a location to exclusively use ZEVs must consider the feasibility of implementing
the order in the location.16 Nevertheless, even if rural areas are granted an
exemption from the mandate for ZEVs, the mandate will limit the amount of nonelectric trucks—adversely affecting rural areas.17 In limiting the number of nonZEVs local governments can sell in urban centers, the ACT and the Executive
Order would limit the number of used vehicles rural government entities could
purchase.18
Conflicts regarding the proper balance between rural and urban political
representation are nothing new.19 In 1964, the Supreme Court decided Reynolds v.
Sims, which challenged the malapportionment of the Alabama Legislature.20 The
Court held that the apportionment of state legislatures cannot be based solely on
geography but instead must be based on population.21 As a result, states must
apportion their legislators to represent people rather than counties or other
geographic or political subdivisions.22 The Court based this decision on the
doctrine of “one person, one vote.”23 By making the population the sole basis for

12. See id. at 3 (detailing various utility companies employ of PSPS to limit the likelihood of wildfire
ignitions from overhead powerlines).
13. Id.
14. See id. at 2 (explaining the difficulty in mandating electric vehicles in rural areas).
15. Governor Newsom Announces California Will Phase Out Gasoline-Powered Cars & Drastically
Reduce Demand for Fossil Fuel in California’s Fight Against Climate Change, OFF. GOVERNOR GAVIN NEWSOM,
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/09/23/governor-newsom-announces-california-will-phase-out-gasoline-poweredcars-drastically-reduce-demand-for-fossil-fuel-in-californias-fight-against-climate-change/ (Sept. 23, 2020) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
16. Id.
17. Heaton, supra note 7, at 2.
18. Id.
19. See Sarah Goodyear, Rebellion in California, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 9, 2016)
https://web.archive.org/web/20170703181837/http://interactive.nydailynews.com/2016/02/state-of-jeffersonsecessionists-california-gun-totin-rebels/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing how
rural residents claimed to be underrepresented even in 1941).
20. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964).
21. Id. at 568.
22. Compare Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568 (majority opinion) (requiring each individual citizen’s vote to have
equal weight); with Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 608–10 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explaining that even into the 1960s,
“all but 11 States recognized bases of apportionment other than geographic spread of population, and to some
extent favored sparsely populated areas by a variety of devices, ranging from straight area representation or
guaranteed minimum area representation,” meaning that some states guaranteed counties at least one
representative).
23. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 (citing Gary v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963)).
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apportioning representation in the legislature, Reynolds granted the more populous
urban areas majority representation.24 By granting the urban population greater
representation, this decision also resulted in the dilution of rural representation.25
Consequently, people in rural areas desire more representation, with some going
as far as calling for a complete secession.26
With its opinion in Reynolds, the Supreme Court invalidated methods of
apportionment in thirty-nine states.27 Rather than allowing the individual states to
decide the method of apportionment suitable for their constituents, the Court
established a one-size-fits-all approach to apportionment—based solely on
population.28 This Comment proposes the Supreme Court should partially overrule
Reynolds as it applies to the upper chamber of a bicameral state legislature.29 The
Supreme Court should allow the states to apportion legislative districts in the upper
chamber to represent political or geographical subdivisions including counties,
towns, or regions.30 The Little Federal Model is a leading option that proposes
allowing States to implement a form of apportionment analogous to the Federal
Congress.31 This proposal grants States with a bicameral legislature the right to
apportion the upper chamber based on territory or political subdivisions—similar
to the US Senate.32 While the lower chamber would retain the one person, one vote
requirement—similar to the US House of Representatives.33
Part II explains the inherent compromise inherent to a republican form of
government—arguing that Reynolds disrupted that compromise.34 Part III details
Reynolds’ resulting partiality in favor of the urban majority in the various states.35
Part IV proposes partially overruling Reynolds to allow for the Little Federal
Model.36 Part V discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause as the basis for the Little Federal Model.37 Part VI addresses the issue of
fairness in apportioning representation.38

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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Goodyear, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 610 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 610 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part IV.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Infra Part II.
Infra Part III.
Infra Part IV.
Infra Part V.
Infra Part VI.
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II REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT—A BALANCING ACT
The Founders attempted to create a form of government in which tyrants would
be unable to establish a foothold.39 To create such a government, the Founders
established a system of governance in which no individual could obtain such power
as to trample on another’s rights.40 As a result, the Founders created a republican
form of government.41 To ensure that the individual states in the Union would
respect and defend minority rights, the Founders enshrined the republican form of
government in the United States Constitution.42
The Constitution’s Guarantee Clause secures the individual states a republican
form of government.43 However, the Guarantee Clause only delegates this
responsibility to the United States; it does not explain what a republican form of
government specifically entails.44 Section A discusses the Founders’ intent
regarding the Guarantee Clause and a republican form of government.45 Section B
expounds on the history of Reynolds.46 Section C argues Reynolds created a
democracy and not a republican form of government.47
A. Government by Representation
The Declaration of Independence declared that “all men are created equal . . .
[and] are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”48 It stipulated
that the purpose of government was to safeguard these unalienable rights of the
people it governed.49 The Declaration of Independence also stated that all
governmental power originates with the people.50 Consequently, the people must
be directly or indirectly involved with government decision making.51
During the Constitutional Convention, some Founders voiced concerns about
the people directly participating in government through direct democracy because
majorities are easily misled.52 The Founders also believed that a direct democracy

39. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (stating that republican principles must create a
government that is able to defend against aristocracies or monarchies).
40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra Section II.A.
46. See infra Section II.B.
47. See infra Section II.C.
48. Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, NAT’L ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/foundingdocs/declaration-transcript (last visited July 24, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. (granting the people the power to determine the form and method of governing).
52. Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, vol. 1, ONLINE LIBR. LIBERTY 50 (1911),
https://oll-resources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/1057/Farrand_0544-01_EBk_v6.0.pdf (on file
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could result in the majority violating the personal security and private rights of the
minority, when the majority is united in a common cause.53 Violations of minority
rights cause contention, which in turn leads to short-lived democracies with a
violent end.54 Furthermore, some Founders refused to believe that granting all
citizens political equality would somehow actually make everyone equal.55
The Founders opted for an indirect democracy—which they referred to as a
republic—where representatives of the people make the laws.56 In a republican
government, representation would resemble the general population as closely as
possible.57 Nevertheless, they understood that a representative body of government
could become self-interested.58 As a bulwark against an all-powerful, selfinterested legislative assembly, the Founders proposed antidemocratic measures.59
These measures included the creation of two separate and distinct legislative
chambers.60 Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislators elected the
upper chamber, which represented the states; the people elected the lower chamber
to represent their interests.61
The Founders feared that when the representative government resembles the
general population, the majority could employ their power to endanger the
minority’s rights—establishing the “tyranny of the majority.”62 When a minority
seeks to adversely affect the interests or rights of the majority, the majoritarian
aspect of a republican government can hinder their plans.63 However, when the
majority seeks to adversely affect the interests or rights of the minority, the
majoritarian aspect of a republican government enables their plans.64
Since the purpose of government is to guarantee and protect the people’s
rights, the Founders sought to protect individual rights while retaining the

with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
53. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“When a majority is included in a faction, the
form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the
public good and the rights of other citizens”).
54. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (arguing how democracies are susceptible to implosion).
55. See id. (arguing that the primary objective of government is to guard the “different and unequal faculties
of acquiring property” to protect against a uniformity of interests).
56. John Adams, The Works of John Adams, vol. 4, ONLINE LIBR. LIBERTY 132 (Sept. 2011), https://ollresources.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/oll3/store/titles/2102/Adams_1431-04_EBk_v6.0.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 133.
59. See id. (proposing a legislative assembly elected by and representing the general population in addition
to a legislative assembly not representing the people).
60. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
61. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1 (establishing the House of Representatives as the only branch
representing the populace); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (granting
the State Legislatures the right to elect the Senators representing the States).
62. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1138 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
(James Madison).
63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
64. Id.
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majoritarian aspect of government.65 Their attempts to balance the individual and
majority interests resulted in many compromises, many of which were
antidemocratic.66 The resulting republican form of government entrusted power in
the majority to further the common good while attempting to curb the majority’s
ability to violate the minority’s rights.67
The Founders understood that the legislative branch would predominate in a
representative republic.68 Thus, the Founders sought to implement various checks
and balances within the legislative branch.69 One form of checks and balances was
the bicameral legislature.70 This bicameral legislature, which became the United
States Congress, was the result of the Great Compromise.71 This compromise
resulted in a legislature with an upper chamber representing the states and a lower
chamber representing the people.72
At the time of the founding, six out of the thirteen states apportioned both
chambers by population.73 Prior to Reynolds, thirty-nine states followed the Great
Compromise in allowing apportionment of at least one chamber by methods other
than population.74 By allowing representation not based on population, the states
65. Declaration of Independence, supra note 48; THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
66. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1 (establishing the House of Representatives as the only branch
representing the populace); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (granting
the State Legislatures the right to elect the Senators representing the States); U.S. CONST. amend. XII (establishing
the method of indirectly electing the President through the Electoral College).
67. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1139 (Thomas, J., concurring); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
69. Id.; see also Farrand, supra note 52, at 357 (describing the proposed compromise of balancing the
interest of small states against the large states).
70. Farrand, supra note 52, at 50, 425.
71. Id. at 357.
72. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2–3 (establishing the House of Representatives as representative of the
people, while each State is guaranteed two Senators).
73. Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 MICH. L. REV. 213, 218 (2003).
74. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 608–10 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The years following 1868, far from indicating a developing awareness of the applicability of the
Fourteenth Amendment to problems of apportionment, demonstrate precisely the reverse: that the
States retained and exercised the power independently to apportion their legislatures . . . Florida’s
Constitution of 1885 continued the guarantee of one representative for each county and reduced the
maximum number of representatives per county from four to three. Georgia, in 1877, continued to
favor the smaller counties. Louisiana, in 1879, guaranteed each parish at least one representative in
the House. In 1890, Mississippi guaranteed each county one representative, established a maximum
number of representatives, and provided that specified groups of counties should each have
approximately one-third of the seats in the House, whatever the spread of population. Missouri’s
Constitution of 1875 gave each county one representative and otherwise favored less populous areas.
Montana’s original Constitution of 1889 apportioned the State Senate by counties. In 1877, New
Hampshire amended its Constitution’s provisions for apportionment, but continued to favor sparsely
settled areas in the House and to apportion seats in the Senate according to direct taxes paid; the same
was true of New Hampshire’s Constitution of 1902.
In 1894, New York adopted a Constitution the peculiar apportionment provisions of which were
obviously intended to prevent representation according to population: no county was allowed to have
more than one-third of all the Senators, no two countries which were adjoining or ‘separated only by
public waters’ could have more than one-half of all the Senators, and whenever any county became
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could mitigate the accumulation of power in the legislative branch—per the
republican form of government.75
B. Evolution of “One Person, One Vote”
The United States Supreme Court undertook the question of political
representation and political equality in a series of three cases: Baker v. Carr76,
Wesberry v. Sanders77, and Reynolds v. Sims.78 In Baker, a group of Tennessee
voters contended that a Tennessee statute establishing the apportionment of the
state’s General Assembly violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.79 The District Court ruled in favor of Tennessee stating that apportionment
was a political question and therefore a nonjusticiable issue for which the court
could not grant relief.80 However, the Supreme Court reversed this ruling and
established that a challenge to a denial of equal protection does not raise a political
nonjusticiable question.81 Rather, allegations of a violation of equal protection
“present[s] a justiciable constitutional cause of action” the courts can decide,
though the Court did not resolve the underlying issue of apportionment.82 Although
the Court held that a challenge to the constitutionality of the apportionment of a
state’s legislative districts is a justiciable question, they did not determine an
appropriate remedy.83 Instead the Court remanded the case to the District Court.84

entitled to more than three Senators, the total number of Senators was increased, thus preserving to
the small counties their original number of seats. In addition, each county except Hamilton was
guaranteed a seat in the Assembly. The North Carolina Constitution of 1876 gave each county at least
one representative and fixed a maximum number of representatives for the whole House. Oklahoma’s
Constitution at the time of its admission to the Union (1907) favored small counties by the use of
partial ratios and a maximum number of seats in the House; in addition, no county was permitted to
‘take part’ in the election of more than seven representatives. Pennsylvania, in 1873, continued to
guarantee each county one representative in the House. The same was true of South Carolina’s
Constitution of 1895, which provided also that each county should elect one and only one Senator.
Utah’s original Constitution of 1895 assured each county of one representative in the House.
Wyoming, when it entered the Union in 1889, guaranteed each county at least one Senator and one
representative.
Id.
75. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing for the division of the legislature into two
separate, distinct, and independent bodies—as the legislative branch is the most powerful in a republic).
76. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
77. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
78. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”); see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 187–88 (challenging an apportionment statute alleging that
plaintiffs’ right to equal protection under the law was abridged “by virtue of the debasement of their votes”).
80. Baker, 369 U.S. at 208–09.
81. Id. at 237.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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In Wesberry, the Supreme Court considered the proportionality of
congressional districts.85 It held that the goal for creating districts for the House of
Representatives must be “equal representation for equal numbers of people.”86
Although the plaintiffs included the Fourteenth Amendment in their challenge, the
Court did not rely on the Fourteenth Amendment for its ruling.87 Instead, it
construed the phrase “by the People of the several States” as meaning that each
person’s vote must be equal in worth to another’s.88 Further, the Court quoted a
passage by James Madison, stating that the phrase alludes to the doctrine of one
person, one vote.89
Finally, after establishing apportionment of districts as a justiciable question
and determining that one person, one vote applies to congressional districts, the
Court took up the question of malapportionment in state legislative districts.90 In
Reynolds, the Court considered a challenge against the apportionment of the
Alabama Legislature.91
The 1901 Alabama Constitution required the state legislature to reapportion
the seats in the Alabama House of Representatives after every decennial census.92
However, from 1911 until 1960, the Alabama Legislature failed to fulfill its duty
and did not reapportion the seats.93 The “residents, taxpayers and voters of
Jefferson County, Alabama,” contended that due to the population growth in
certain counties, “they were denied ‘equal suffrage in free and equal elections.’”94
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the legislature failed in fulfilling its
constitutional duty of reapportioning the seats.95 However, it stated that the
Constitution delegated reapportionment to the state legislature and therefore was
not an area with which it could or would interfere.96 Thus, the Alabama Supreme
Court considered legislative apportionment a political question, which they left to
the legislature to decide.97

85. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 2 (1964).
86. Id. at 18.
87. See Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 3, 8 (analyzing plaintiffs’ three causes of action (1) a violation of the U.S.
Constitution, art 1, § 2; (2) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) a
violation of § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment pertaining to the apportionment of the legislatures. Although the
Court mentioned the Equal Protection Clause as being the dispositive factor in Baker v. Carr, in this case, it found
a violation on the first cause of action and did not consider the other two); id. at 19 (Clark, J., concurring)
(proposing to analyze this case under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
88. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 7–8 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2).
89. Id. at 18 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison)).
90. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964); Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 18; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
237 (1962).
91. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 537.
92. Id. at 538.
93. Id. at 540.
94. Id. at 537, 540.
95. Id. at 540–41.
96. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540–41.
97. Id. at 541.
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On appeal, the Federal District Court disagreed and stated that the Alabama
Legislature had to reapportion its districts in accordance with its constitutionally
mandated duty and the court-determined constitutional standard.98 The Alabama
Legislature proposed two reapportionment plans, both of which the District Court
struck down and substituted with its own plan.99 The District Court’s plan adopted
the apportionment of the Senate based on the Crawford–Webb Act and the House
of Representatives based on the 67-Senator Amendment.100 The Alabama
Legislature appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, alleging that the District
Court erred in ruling the two proposals unconstitutional.101 Additionally, the
legislature alleged that a federal court cannot determine the means of apportioning
seats in a state legislature because that is a political question left to the states.102
In Reynolds, the Court reiterated its holdings in Baker and Wesberry while
expounding on the definition of an Equal Protection Clause violation, as it pertains
to apportionment of state legislative districts103 It held that the right to vote is “a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.”104 Consequently, the Court
prohibited a dilution of one’s voting power.105 However, rather than limiting the
requirement of equal representation of districts to one chamber—as in Wesberry—
the Warren Court expanded this requirement to “both houses of a bicameral state
legislature.”106
C. Government by Majoritarianism
The republican form of government is one of compromise—balancing the
desires of the majority with the rights of the minority.107 However, Reynolds
appears to favor the majority by disregarding the minority.108 By requiring that
both chambers of a state legislature be based on population, the Court ensured the
minority would have little recourse in defending their rights.109
98. Id. at 542–43.
99. Id. at 543–45, 552 (discussing the Alabama Legislature’s two proposed plans (1) the 67-Senator
Amendment forming a 106-member House of Representatives by giving each county one representative and
apportioning the rest according to population, the Senate provided each county with one Senator; and (2) the
Crawford–Webb Act providing for a 35-member Senate and a 106-member House of Representative apportioned
roughly along the lines of the first proposal).
100. Id. at 552.
101. Id. at 552.
102. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554.
103. Id. at 561.
104. Id. at 561–62.
105. Id. at 562–62.
106. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568; see Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1964) (establishing the “one
person, one vote” requirement for apportioning districts to only the seats comprising the lower chamber of
Congress—the House of Representatives).
107. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1139 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10
(James Madison).
108. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
109. Id. at 568; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (describing how the majority is able to
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Reynolds creates a strict form of a republican government in that it requires
the majority to elect a majority of the representatives.110 However, it undermines
the balance the Founders sought by the Founders—balancing the desires of the
majority with the rights of the minority.111 In mandating a uniform method of

apportionment—based solely on population—Reynolds disrupted the balance the
Founders viewed as inherent and essential to a republican form of government.112
III. DISREGARD OF MINORITY RIGHTS POST-REYNOLDS
As a result of Reynolds, Senator Everett Dirksen feared that the political power
would shift to the majority in the urban centers and enable them to control the
states.113 Furthermore, the majority—now entrenched in control of the state—
would be free to disregard the minority in rural areas.114 Senator Dirksen believed
that in disregarding the interest of the minority, the people in power would then
propose policies favoring the urban centers and disfavoring the rural areas. 115
While at other times the majority-elected representatives would propose statewide
one-size-fits-all legislation.116
Senator Dirksen also opined that Reynolds would allow self-serving party
functionaries—who would not be answerable to the people—to control the state.117
Section A discusses the first concern of the majority trampling the rights of the
minority, which lead to calls for secession.118 Section B details Senator Dirksen’s
second concern of an entrenched political class answerable only to itself,
reproaching anyone who dares to question them.119

sacrifice the minority’s rights and the public good to further their interests).
110. Id. at 565.
111. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton).
112. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; see THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (describing how a
republican government must protect minority rights while allowing for majority common interest).
113. UDALL, supra note 1.
114. Id.
115. See SB 474, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2020) (as amended on June 19, 2020, but not enacted)
(seeking to ban new development in high fire hazard zones or state responsibility areas, most of which are in rural
areas).
116. See Erika D. Smith, Column: This is the Only California County That’s Coronavirus-Free. Masks are
Optional, L.A. TIMES (July 8, 2020, 5:00 A.M.), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-0708/coronavirus-mask-test-modoc-county-rural-california (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review)
(questioning the efficacy of a one-size-fits-all strategy for combatting the coronavirus with counties as disparate
as Los Angeles and Modoc).
117. David E. Kyvig, Everett Dirksen’s Constitutional Crusades, 95 J. ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y 68, 77 (2002).
118. Infra Section III.A.
119. Infra Section III.B.
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A. Secessionist Movements in the Various States
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reynolds invalidated the methods of
apportionment and the apportionment of legislative districts in thirty-nine states.120
Some apportionment methods included “straight area representation or guaranteed
minimum area representation,” while one complex scheme sought to “preserv[e]
to the small counties their original number of seats.”121 These methods of
apportionment were favorable to the less-populated areas of the state.122
Consequently, the Supreme Court created a situation where state representatives
predominantly represent the urban areas.123
Rural underrepresentation is an issue since urban residents electing the
majority of the representatives “know little and care less about the lives of people
out in the country.”124 Many people in rural areas think that urban residents even
hold them in disdain.125 This disregard from urban dwellers towards their rural
counterparts leads many rural citizens to call for secession from the urban
majorities.126 The perceived disregard rural residents feel is universal throughout
the various secessionist movements.127 Another reason rural-dwellers call for
secession is no “taxation without representation.”128 The desire to break away is
not solely founded on taxation.129 It also finds its basis in “regulation without
representation.”130
Many of the movements have not advocated for outright secession.131 Some
merely call for shifting the state lines while others seek to alter the state governance
structure.132 Subsection 1 chronicles the suggestions calling for complete
succession and the founding of new states.133 Subsection 2 explores the
recommendations of altering state boundary lines rather than creating new

120. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 610 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 609–10 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 610 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
123. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Across the Country, Rural Communities Want to Secede from Their States.
Here’s
Why,
USA
TODAY
(updated
Feb.
26,
2020,
6:00
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/02/26/across-country-rural-communities-secede-states-whycolumn/4851817002/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Reynolds, supra note 123.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See Valerie Richardson, Secession Fever Spikes in Five States as Conservatives Seek to Escape Blue
Rule, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/feb/19/secession-feverspikes-conservatives-seek-escape-b/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing some
counties seeking to join neighboring states and other counties aiming to start new entirely new states).
133. Infra Subsection III.A.1.
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states.134 Subsection 3 examines a New York secession movement’s unique
approach to rural underrepresentation.135
1. Proposed 51st State of America
In 1941, several counties in Northern California and Southern Oregon
proposed seceding from their states to form the State of Jefferson.136 The primary
impetus for seceding was that both Sacramento and Salem were ignoring the rural
residents along the border of the two states.137 In December 1941, the proponents
went as far as proclaiming independence.138 However, the attack on Pearl Harbor
and the subsequent war ended talks of secession.139
California amended its Constitution after the Reynolds decision.140 Before
1968, each county in California could have no more than one senator, and each
senator could not represent more than three counties.141 However, the Reynolds
ruling invalidated the method of apportionment in California’s 1967
Constitution.142 Reynolds removed the requirement tying representation in the
California State Senate to the counties.143 As a result, California counties today
with large populations have many senatorial districts, while the rural counties
comprise of only one.144 The concentration of so many Senators in one county is
one of the reasons people are once again advocating for the State of Jefferson. 145
As a result, rural residents decry that California is “governed by Los Angeles and
San Francisco.”146
The idea of the State of Jefferson predates the Reynolds decision—there was
even a secession movement in Northern California in 1852.147 However, the
Reynolds decision not only revived the State of Jefferson movement, but also
expanded it.148 The original movement only encompassed parts of Southern
134. Infra Subsection III.A.2.
135. Infra Subsection III.A.3.
136. Goodyear, supra note 19.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (West 2021) (lacking discussion on apportionment).
141. Id.
142. See id. (granting each county at least one Senator).
143. Id.; Goodyear, supra note 19.
144. Goodyear, supra note 19; see, e.g., CAL. STATE SENATE, SENATE COUNTIES REPRESENTED 1–3
(2021–22), https://www.senate.ca.gov/sites/senate.ca.gov/files/2021-22_senate_counties_represented.pdf (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing Los Angeles County as having fifteen senators, while
eleven rural counties in northern California have only one senator).
145. Goodyear, supra note 19.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Andre Byik, Tehama County Supervisors Declare Support for State of Jefferson, RED BLUFF DAILY
NEWS (updated May 16, 2018, 9:36 AM), https://www.redbluffdailynews.com/2014/07/15/tehama-countysupervisors-declare-support-for-state-of-jefferson/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); OFF.
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Oregon and Northern California; the new movement encompasses up to twentythree counties and extends south of Sacramento.149
In addition to political underrepresentation, proponents of the State of
Jefferson cite economic and environmental regulations as grievances worthy of
secession.150 In November 2015, California’s Siskiyou County had an
unemployment rate of 9.2 percent compared to 3.4 percent in San Francisco.151
Siskiyou County residents fault the government for their woes, as the federal and
state governments own and control almost 70 percent of the land in the county.152
Environmental restrictions on logging and mining exacerbate these economic
woes.153
The 1941 secessionist movement in Northern California and Southern Oregon
was based on politicians in Sacramento and Salem ignoring the residents of the
proposed State of Jefferson.154 The current secessionist movement is based on
Sacramento’s overregulation of the State of Jefferson through environmental
regulations, which has eliminated the industries the locals rely on.155 A former
miner stated, “California takes away our property, takes away our rights. That’s a
form of tyranny. If we govern ourselves, at least we’re responsible to ourselves.”156
This is a textbook example of “regulation without representation.”157
Currently, there is a proposal in Illinois for reverse secession.158 Rather than
seceding from Illinois, the proposal would force Chicago out of Illinois—
establishing Chicago as a separate state.159 According to Illinois State
Representative Brad Halbrook—the author of the proposal—the current political
system concentrates all of the power near Chicago.160 Consequently, many
Chicago politicians disregard the concerns of the rest of the state—the primary
impetus for this proposal.161 This estimation is in line with Senator Dirksen’s
prescient commentary.162 “[W]ith Reynolds v. Sims, the major metropolitan areas,
the large population centers, are going to control the rest of the state, and that’s
ST. JEFFERSON MOVEMENT, https://soj51.org/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review).
149. Map, OFF. ST. JEFFERSON MOVEMENT, https://soj51.org/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
150. Goodyear, supra note 19.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Goodyear, supra note 19 (describing the current State of Jefferson proposal, which consists of
twenty-three counties in California. However, some counties in Southern Oregon, formerly part of the State of
Jefferson, have their own proposed secessionist movement, seeking to join Idaho); Map, supra note 149.
156. Goodyear, supra note 19.
157. Reynolds, supra note 123.
158. Richardson, supra note 132.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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what’s happened with Illinois . . . .”163
2. Modifying Boundaries Without Creating States
In Colorado, there is a secessionist movement to alter the Wyoming–Colorado
border.164 Rather than creating a new state, the proponents seek to move Weld
County from Colorado to Wyoming.165 A reason for the secessionist movement
stems from the urban liberal-led social and environmental agendas emerging from
Denver and Boulder counties.166
In 2018, Colorado voters overwhelmingly defeated Proposition 112, which
proposed strict setback limits.167 If enacted, the proposal would drastically and
negatively impact the oil and gas industry by limiting developments to fifteen
percent of non-federal land.168 This ban on development would impact the
Wattenberg Field in Weld County—“one of the top ten producing oil and gas fields
in the country.”169 Then in 2019, the legislature in Denver disregarded the voice of
the people by enacting Senate Bill 181 (“SB 181”).170 In enacting SB 181,
legislators claimed that it was not identical to Proposition 112, and thus would not
stifle the oil and gas sector in Colorado.171 As a result of SB 181, various counties
and locales implemented either moratoria or regulations on drilling—thereby
achieving the result voters attempted to avert in defeating Proposition 112.172
163. Id.
164. Dick Wadhams, Wadhams: Weld County Secession to Wyoming may be Unlikely, but the UrbanLiberal Assault on Rural Colorado is Real, DENVER POST (Feb. 4, 2021, 8:22 AM),
https://www.denverpost.com/2021/02/04/weld-county-succession-unlikely-urban-liberal-assault-rural-colorado/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.; see Nora Olabi, Study Shows Setback Petition Would Stop New Oil, Gas Development in Half the
State, WESTWORD (July 10, 2018, 5:34 AM), https://www.westword.com/news/colorado-oil-and-gasconservation-commission-setbacks-would-ban-new-oil-gas-drilling-in-half-of-colorado-10507233 (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining a setback limit as the distance an oil and gas developer must
have between any proposed oil or gas development and certain structures. “Existing state regulations specify
minimum setback requirements for oil and gas facilities at 350 feet for outdoor-activity areas like playgrounds,
500 feet for occupied buildings, and 1,000 feet for high-occupancy buildings like schools or hospitals.”
Proposition 112 sought to increase these setback limits to 2,500 feet from occupied buildings and public spaces
for “exploration, drilling, production or processing and treatment of hydrocarbons as well as flowlines”).
168. Olabi, supra note 167.
169. Id.
170. Wadhams, supra note 164.
171. Id.; Colorado’s Sweeping Oil and Gas Law: One Year Later, GIBSON DUNN, 1, 2 (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/colorados-sweeping-oil-and-gas-law-one-yearlater.pdf (describing SB 181 and its three major provisions: First, SB-181 granted local governments power to
regulate future oil and gas development within their jurisdictions, including the power to preempt less restrictive
statewide regulations promulgated by the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (“COGCC”) . . .
Second, SB-181 altered the overall mission of state regulators. Previously, the COGCC was charged with a
statutory mandate to “foster” development of oil and gas resources to achieve the “maximum efficient rate of
production” . . . Third, SB-181 called for the restructuring and professionalization of the COGCC).
172. See GIBSON DUNN, supra note 171 at 1, 2 (describing the effects of SB 181 on the oil and gas sector).
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The urban disrespect for rural famers was also on full display when Governor
Jared Polis nominated an anti-meat activist to the Colorado Board of Veterinary
Medicine.173 This was after Governor Polis recanted his support for plant-based
meats over livestock producers, who comprise seventy percent of Colorado’s $7
billion agricultural industry.174
In Virginia, there is a similar proposal to transfer counties across state
boundaries.175 The issue of contention in Virginia is gun control.176 After the
Democrats took control of the state government in 2019, they enacted a myriad of
gun control measures, including assault rifle bans.177 Some counties responded by
becoming “Second Amendment Sanctuaries,” refusing to enforce gun control
legislation.178
Just like in Colorado, the urban metropolis controls the rest of the
Commonwealth of Virginia.179 Due to the large increase of federal employees in
the Northern Virginia metropolis, rural residents favoring gun rights have little
prospect of reversing their electoral losses.180 In response to rural
underrepresentation, West Virginia invited any county from Virginia to leave the
Commonwealth of Virginia in favor of West Virginia.181
3. A Unique Proposal from Upstate New York
The New York proposal is neither secession nor border readjustment; rather,
it is a change in the system of governance.182 The proposal seeks to create three
self-governing regions and bypass the need for congressional approval in creating
a new state.183 Under this proposal, the autonomous regions would subsume most
government functions: taxation, criminal justice, judiciary, education, and
economic policy.184 Further, each regional government would have an executive
branch comprised of various executive officers, while the legislative branch of the
state and regions would be held in common.185 The regional senators and regional

173. Wadhams, supra note 164.
174. Id.
175. Richardson, supra note 132.
176. Id.
177. Kelly Mena, West Virginia Republicans encourage conservative Virginia counties to ‘Vexit,’ CNN
(Feb. 9, 2020, 1:04 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/09/politics/west-virginia-republicans-pushvexit/index.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
178. Id.
179. Richardson, supra note 132.
180. Id.
181. Mena, supra note 177.
182. Richardson, supra note 132.
183. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (requiring congressional approval only for the admission or
formation of new states, not for amending state constitutions); Richardson, supra note 132.
184. Divide New York Plan, DIVIDE NYS CAUCUS, INC., https://www.divideny.org/divide-new-yorkplan.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2020) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
185. Id.
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assembly members would also be members of the New York Senate and New York
Assembly, respectively.186 The proposal retains a token New York State
Government to primarily oversee pensions, the National Guard, and a truncated
judiciary.187
B. Political Retribution in Action
Concentration of power was another consequence of the Reynolds decision.188
If power becomes concentrated in one or two regions, political operatives who
manage to control a majority of the votes in those regions will control the state.189
However, those same people who control the state will not be beholden to anybody
but themselves.190
The response to the 2020 coronavirus pandemic was an example of both
concerns—disregard for the interests of the rural areas and party leaders holding
onto control.191 California’s responses to the pandemic under Governor Gavin
Newsom is a great example of a one-size-fits-all solution, disregarding rural
interests or concerns.192
To combat the pandemic, Governor Newsom ordered a statewide lockdown in
March 2020.193 Although, the rural Modoc County did not get its first coronavirus
case until late-July 2020, it was still subject to the statewide lockdown.194 Since
Modoc County was already economically depressed before the pandemic, it defied
Governor Newsom’s order and reopened in May.195 Before reopening, Modoc
County Sheriff Tex Dowdy sent the Governor’s Office a draft plan for reopening
the county.196 Rather than responding, the Governor’s Office sent a letter “accusing
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Kyvig, supra note 117, at 77.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See Kathleen Ronayne, California Threatens 3 Counties’ Aid as Reopening Begins, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (May 8, 2020, 10:13 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/california/articles/2020-0508/as-california-reopening-begins-newsom-says-expect-more-soon (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (reporting on the California Governor threatening to cut funding to rural counties for refusing to follow
his executive orders).
192.
See CAL. EXEC. ORDER N-33-20, (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER-03.19.2020-002.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (lacking provisions taking urban–rural distinctions into consideration).
193.
CAL. EXEC. ORDER N-33-20,
(Mar.
19,
2020),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-ORDER-03.19.2020-002.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review).
194. John Antczak, California’s Remote Modoc County Has Its 1st COVID-19 Cases, AP (July 29, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/nevada-health-california-virus-outbreak-public-health522d134ca345f834229b976ba2fc8e33 (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
195. Julia Sulek, This One California County Has Zero Coronavirus Cases. What’s Its Secret?, TWIN
CITIES PIONEER PRESS (July 13, 2020, 12:25 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2020/07/13/this-one-californiacounty-has-zero-coronavirus-cases-whats-its-secret/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
196.
Id.; see Office of Emergency Services, MODOC COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFF.,
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officials of ignoring state orders and threatening to withhold disaster funds should
their ‘careless and hasty actions’ cause an outbreak.”197
In January 2021, the California State Auditor issued a report highlighting how
the state allocated funds from the Coronavirus Relief Fund (“CRF”).198 The report
confirmed that although the Governor’s Office did not follow through on its threat
to cut Modoc County’s funding, rural counties received nearly half of what urban
counties received.199 Despite certain rural counties having higher rates of infection,
they received only $102 per person compared to $190–197 per person in urban
counties.200
The state’s disdain does not stop at duly elected sheriffs but extends to small
business owners and restauranteurs as well.201 After requiring restaurant owners to
follow stringent, costly guidelines and outdoor operations only, the State of
California banned outdoor dining altogether—touting science as its guide.202
Despite science supposedly guiding California’s decision making, a judge in Los
Angeles ruled the local outdoor dining ban “was not grounded in science, evidence,
or logic.”203 California Health and Human Services Secretary Mark Ghaly
https://www.modocsheriff.us/office-emergency-services (last visited Apr. 23, 2021) (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review); (describing how the the Office of Emergency Services (“OES”) is the countywide
agency tasked with “provid[ing] a structure for emergency response that minimizes the loss of lives and the
destruction of property, while maintaining governmental services during an emergency.” OES is also the agency
tasked with the Emergency Operations Plan, in response to emergencies.); see also Governor Newsom Declares
State of Emergency to Help State Prepare for Broader Spread of COVID-19, OFF. GOV’R GAVIN NEWSOM (Mar.
4, 2020), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/03/04/governor-newsom-declares-state-of-emergency-to-help-stateprepare-for-broader-spread-of-covid-19/ ) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (establishing
that as of March 2020 California was in a state of emergency); see also MODOC COUNTY EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS PLAN, MODOC COUNTY OFF, EMERGENCY SERVICES, 1.5 (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.modocsheriff.us/sites/g/files/vyhlif921/f/uploads/eop_section_1_basic_plan.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review)(designating the duly elected Modoc County Sheriff, Tex Dowdy as the
official in charge of the Modoc County Sheriff’s Office’ and the OES as the primary officla responsible for
responding to emergencies“”. Consequently, in drafting the reopening plan, Sheriff Dowdy was following
established protocol and responding to the emergency declared by Governor Gavin Newsom).
197. Sulek, supra note 195.
198. ELAINE M. HOWLE, STATE HIGH RISK UPDATE—FEDERAL COVID-19 FUNDING 1 (Jan. 19, 2021),
http://auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2020-610.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
199. Id. at 4.
200. Id.
201. See Zach Weissmueller, Los Angeles County Banned Outdoor Dining. There’s Zero Evidence It
Spreads COVID-19., REASON (Nov. 30, 2020, 2:00 PM), https://reason.com/video/2020/11/30/los-angelescounty-banned-outdoor-dining-theres-zero-evidence-it-spreads-covid-19/ (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (explaining how restauranteurs expended large sums of money to follow government
guidelines and expand outdoor dining to now even have outdoor dining banned).
202. Jacob Sullum, California’s Health Secretary Concedes There Is No Empirical Basis for the State’s
Ban on Outdoor Dining, REASON (Dec. 11, 2020, 12:15 PM), https://reason.com/2020/12/11/californias-healthsecretary-concedes-there-is-no-empirical-basis-for-the-states-ban-on-outdoor-dining/ (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review); see Steve Almasy, et. al., California Gov. Gavin Newsom Says Science, Not Political
Will,
Dictates
When
State
Can
Reopen,
CNN
(April
14,
2020,
10:58
PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/14/us/us-coronavirus-reopening-tuesday/index.html (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (reiterating “[s]cience, not politics must be the guide” in determining when life gets back
to normal).
203. Sullum, supra note 202.
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acknowledged the statewide ban was likewise devoid of evidence and science on
“the relative safety of outdoor dining.”204 Instead the ban “has to do with the goal
of trying to keep people at home.”205
The ban on outdoor dining cost restaurateurs tens—if not hundreds—of
thousands of dollars.206 However, this ban on outdoor dining did not prohibit all
food services.207 One restaurateur claimed, “a film production crew set up a food
truck and tented dining area in the parking lot where she’d built her outdoor dining
patio.”208 Since Governor Newsom declared film production an essential service,
some reporters question the film industry’s exemption.209 Notably, the Governor
granted the exemption in November after a “behested payment” from Netflix and
a birthday dinner for its lobbyist—“at the famed French Laundry restaurant.”210
IV. THE LITTLE FEDERAL MODEL
The republican form of government is inherently a balancing act—ensuring
the majority’s interests without infringing the minority’s rights.211 The Founders
understood the importance of implementing checks and balances: ensuring the
majority cannot threaten the minority’s rights—even property rights under the
guise of science or safety.212 Before the decision in Reynolds, thirty-nine states
sought to implement this balance through apportioning legislative districts on
bases other than population.213 Reynolds disrupted this balance by focusing solely
on population.214

204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Ashley Riegle, Marjorie McAfee, & Anthony Rivas, LA Business Owners Fighting to Survive in
Pandemic Feel Mix of Hope and Frustration, ABC NEWS (Mar. 4, 2021, 3:38 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/la-business-owners-fighting-survive-pandemic-feel-mix/story?id=76256181 (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.; Jacob McLeod, Donations ‘Requested’ by Newsom Exploded as His Emergency Powers
Ballooned, REASON (Feb. 18, 2021, 12:30 PM), https://reason.com/2021/02/18/donations-requested-by-newsomexploded-as-his-emergency-powers-ballooned/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
210. McLeod, supra note 209; see Behested Payments Search: Increasing Transparency, CAL. FAIR POL.
PRAC. COMM’N, https://www.fppc.ca.gov/transparency/behested-payments.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2021) (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining behested payments as a payment “made at the
request, suggestion, or solicitation of, or made in cooperation, consultation, coordination, or concert with the
public official; made for a legislative, governmental or charitable purpose; and [the payment] does not qualify as
a gift (made for personal purposes) or a contribution (made for election-related activity) to the elected official”).
211. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
212. Id.; see also Riegle, et al., supra note 206 (describing how the outdoor dining ban cost a restaurant
owner over $500 million, while simultaneously allowing the entertainment industry to conduct outdoor dining in
the same parking lot).
213. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 610 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 568.
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The United States Congress implemented this balance through a bicameral
legislature in which each chamber is separate and distinct.215 The upper chamber—
the Senate—consisting of two members from each state, represented the states—
prior to the Seventeenth Amendment.216 The lower chamber—the House of
Representatives—represents the people.217 The distinction ensured Congress
would consider issues other than those in large states.218
The Little Federal Model grants individual states autonomy to determine how
to balance the majority’s interests and the minority’s rights.219 It consists of
bicameral state legislatures consisting of separate and distinct chambers
representing different entities.220 The lower chamber would represent the people.221
The upper chamber would represent political and geographical subdivisions—
regions, counties, cities, towns, etc.—based on an individual state’s
apportionment.222 Since political subdivisions are not sovereign, but rather statecreated governmental instrumentalities, the Little Federal Model would be
analogous to Congress only in form and not reasoning.223
A method for establishing the balance inherent in a republican form of
government is dividing the legislative branch into separate and distinct
chambers.224 The Little Federal Model divides the legislative branch into distinct
chambers.225 By allowing different regions and political subdivisions to have
representation, the Little Federal Model ensures that both rural and urban residents
have a voice in government.226
By seeking to ensure equal representation, Reynolds eliminated the
representation and interests of the rural voters from the government.227 The Little
215. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (establishing the House of Representatives as representative of the people);
see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (describing how the Senate represents the States).
216. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (describing how the Senate represented the States).
217. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (establishing the House of Representatives as representative of the people).
218. See Amanda Onion, How the Great Compromise and the Electoral College Affects Politics Today,
HISTORY (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/how-the-great-compromise-affects-politics-today (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (emphasizing that equal distribution of power in the Senate is
critical).
219. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (explaining the government’s role in balancing
majority’s interests without infringing the minority’s rights).
220. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (establishing the House of Representatives as representative of the people);
see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (describing how the Senate represents the States).
221. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (establishing the House of Representatives as representative of the people).
222. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (describing how the Senate represents the States).
223. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2–3 (establishing the House of Representatives as representative of the
people, while each State is guaranteed two Senators); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
224. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton).
225. Id.
226. See Gary Gregg, Electoral College Keeps Elections Fair, POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2012, 9:29 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/keep-electoral-college-for-fair-presidential-votes-084651 (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how direct democracy and “abolishing the [antidemocratic]
Electoral College would mean ignoring every rural and small-state voter in our country”).
227. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–566 (1964); see also Gregg, supra note 226 (explaining how
direct democracy and “abolishing the [antidemocratic] Electoral College would mean ignoring every rural and
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Federal Model would grant a voice to rural voters by ensuring statewide dispersal
of state legislative districts rather than district concentration in large metropolitan
urban areas.228 In granting the rural areas representation in the upper house, the
Little Federal Model would allow for more equitable laws for both urban and rural
residents.229
V. NONJUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause in Reynolds to confirm the one person, one vote doctrine.230 However, the
result of applying the one person, one vote standard to both chambers resulted in
an infringement on the rights of rural residents.231 In attempting to protect the
interests of the urban majority, Reynolds infringed on the rights of the rural
minority, which is what the Founders sought to prevent.232
The Court has held that the consideration of the Guarantee Clause is a
nonjusticiable political question.233 One of the reasons the Court refuses to
consider political questions under the Guarantee Clause is the lack of judicial
standards courts could apply.234
In the case of the Little Federal Model, a state would decide the upper chamber
of the legislature’s apportionment based on local considerations.235 As such, the
standard for apportioning state legislatures would be different in each individual
state, preventing the establishment of uniform judicial standards for
apportionment.236 Therefore, the Little Federal Model derives its authority from
the Guarantee Clause because it involves the consideration of structuring a
chamber of the legislature—an inherently political question.237

small-state voter in our country”).
228.
See CAL. STATE SENATE, SENATE COUNTIES REPRESENTED 1–3 (2021–22),
https://www.senate.ca.gov/sites/senate.ca.gov/files/2021-22_senate_counties_represented.pdf (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (listing the various counties represented by the senators, approximately 22
of whom represent Los Angeles and the Bay Area).
229. See Wadhams, supra note 164 (describing how the legislative leadership center in Denver and Boulder
disregarded the vote of the people in order to hamper the oil and gas industry—in rural Colorado).
230. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
231. Supra Part III.
232. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
233. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42 (1849).
234. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962).
235. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (describing how the upper chamber was not based on representing the
populace).
236. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 608–10 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing various
methods of apportioning representation).
237. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. at 42 (explaining how questions of political rights should not be
adjudicated in the courts).
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VI. FAIRNESS IN LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
In Reynolds, the Court held that the goal of apportioning legislative districts is
to achieve “fair and effective representation for all citizens.”238 The political ideal
of fairness is for the “majority of the people of a State [to] elect a majority of that
State’s” representatives.239 Nevertheless, the current reality of representation is
inequitable because politicians who can control the votes gain the upper hand.240
Furthermore, technology allows politicians to select individual voters for their
elections, which is an inversion of the ideal of representation and cannot be
considered fair.241
Every ten years, the state legislatures or state redistricting commissions redraw
the legislative districts to align with shifts in population.242 After the 2010 census,
the North Carolina Republican Party redrew the congressional districts obtaining
an advantage of 10–3 seats, after disfavoring them 6–7 for three election cycles.243
The resulting gerrymandered districts were precise: the mapmakers split precincts
and were able to select individual voters for the desired districts.244 Governor
Martin O’Malley of Maryland also participated in redrawing congressional
districts for political purposes.245 In one district, the Democratic Party needed to
adjust the number of voters by 10,000.246 So they shifted select precincts consisting
of 360,000 voters out of the district.247 In place of those precincts, they shifted a
number of other precincts, consisting of 350,000 other voters.248 The resulting
district consisted of 66,000 fewer registered Republican voters and an additional
24,000 registered Democrats.249
The proposed Little Federal Model would eliminate partisan gerrymandering
in the upper chamber since the boundaries of political subdivisions do not change

238. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565–566.
239. Id. at 565.
240. See John Hart Ely, Confounded By Cromartie: Are Racial Stereotypes Now Acceptable Across The
Board Or Only When Used In Support Of Partisan Gerrymanders?, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 489, 505 (2002)
(discussing how modern day computers can assist a political boss to undo one person, one vote reapportionment).
241. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2513 (2019) (Kagan, J. dissenting) (explaining how
the technology can provide information about individual voter preferences); see also Ely, supra note 240
(discussing how modern day computers can assist a political boss to undo one person, one vote reapportionment).
242. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (mandating the decennial census); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
568 (granting states representation based on population).
243. Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race, ATLANTIC (Oct. 28,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering-technology-redmap-2020/543888/
(on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
244. See id. (“Precincts are the lowest level at which aggregated official political data is available. . . .
Since precincts as designated and created by towns and counties are the primary unit of elections
administration.”).
245. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2493.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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every ten years.250 As such, the proposal would ensure the people select their
representative to the upper chamber, rather than the representatives selecting the
voters.251 By fixing the district to certain boundaries, the proposal would prevent
the politicians or redistricting commissioners from shifting precincts to determine
the composition of the district.252
Another concern with legislative apportionment is defining fairness.253
Defining fairness would necessitate the reviewing court to answer purely political
rather than legal questions.254 Although the one person, one vote doctrine may
seem objective and easier to apply—“as a matter of math”—defining it is not as
straightforward as math.255 The Supreme Court has yet to resolve if the one person,
one vote doctrine requires equality of the voter-eligible population—each vote
weights the same—or equality of the total population.256 The Little Federal Model
limits this second concern regarding definitions to the lower chamber.257 The
proposal would free the courts from attempting to adjudicate the equality of voters
or population in the political subdivisions of the upper chamber.258
VII. CONCLUSION
Prior to Reynolds, an overwhelming majority of states rejected the notion that
population should be the sole basis for equal representation.259 Rather, states
apportioned representation to counties and other area-based districts—favoring the

250. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (mandating the decennial census); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (granting states representation based on population).
251. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (granting states—a political entity— two Senators irrespective of
population or time); see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (explaining how
modern, sophisticated technology allows politicians to know information about individual voter preferences, in
drawing maps of new districts).
252. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (setting representation based on a political entity); see also Rucho v.
Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2513 (explaining how moderns sophisticated technology was used in drawing
specific districts).
253. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. at 2499–2500 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291
(2004)).
254. Id. at 2500.
255. Id. at 2501; see also Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1134 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(discussing the Court’s lack of clarity when attempting to explain the one person, one vote principle).
256. Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1133.
257. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (limiting the representation of the people to the lower house); see also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964) (attempting to adjudicate equality of representation in proposed
legislative districts); see also Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1133 (adjudicating the equality of districts produced by a
uniform districting method).
258. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 537 (attempting to adjudicate equality of representation in proposed
legislative districts); see also Evenwel, 136 S. Ct. at 1133 (adjudicating the equality of districts produced by a
uniform districting method).
259. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 608–10 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (listing states and their methods of
apportionment).
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less-populated rural areas.260 However in 1964, the Supreme Court imposed a
uniform method of legislative apportionment based solely on population.261
This one-size-fits-all solution shifted the political power to the dense urban
areas—resulting in rural underrepresentation.262 As a result, some states enacted
laws favoring urban areas and disregarding rural areas.263 The resulting taxation
and regulation without representation gave rise to various secessionist
movements.264 In some cases, the secessionist movements pre-dated Reynolds and
the ruling reinvigorated them, while in others the ruling was the primary impetus
for secessionist fervor.265
To limit rural marginalization, this Comment proposes overruling Reynolds’
application to the upper chamber of a bicameral state legislature and allowing
states to implement the Little Federal Model.266 This proposal would retain the
population requirement for apportioning state legislative districts only for the
lower chamber of a bicameral state legislature.267 The states would have the option
of apportioning the upper chamber based on means other than population.268
The Founders sought to create a government that would further the interest of
the majority while protecting rights of the minority.269 The Little Federal Model
would allow states to find a method of balancing the competing interests of the
majority and the rights of the minority.270 In seeking that balance, the states would
be able to better achieve the Founders’ vision for a republican form of
government.271

260. Id. at 610 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 568.
262. Reynolds, supra note 123.
263. Supra Sections III.A.–III.B.
264. Supra Section III.A.
265. Supra Section III.A.
266. Supra Part IV.
267. Supra Part IV.
268. Supra Part IV.
269. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
270. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining how forming separate and distinct
legislative chambers limits protects the minority rights from infringement).
271. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (explaining the government’s role in balancing
majority’s interests without infringing the minority’s rights).
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